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DEFERRED COMPENSATION UNDER THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1969
David R. Goode*
E XECUTIVE compensation covers a broad range of benefits, including
current cash payments, stock bonuses and options in their various
forms, qualified pension plans, life insurance and even such fringe benefits
as use of company provided automobiles and aircraft. A significant portion
of the compensation picture encompasses contracts and plans which defer
the receipt of income until a taxable period later than the period to which
the services giving rise to the compensation are related. Although only one
of many compensation devices, deferred compensation is of considerable
importance to American industry as a form of executive pay. A recent study
of executive remuneration of the Fortune "Top 100" industrial companies
showed that fifty-nine of the companies offered their executives some form
of deferred compensation contract or plan.'
The Tax Reform Act of 19692 has occasioned the reevaluation of a
number of existing tax planning devices, including deferred compensation
plans. The present analysis will concentrate on the status of certain com-
monly used deferred compensation arrangements in light of changes made
by the Tax Reform Act. The tax status of the recipient will be emphasized
with only passing examination given to the employer's deductions.
I. Deferred Compensation and Its Objectives
The main reason for the existence of deferred compensation is found in
Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code which establishes (absent the Tax
Reform Act changes) rates ranging as high as seventy per cent on taxable
income. Given high tax rates, there is an incentive for tax planners and
their corporate clients to develop means of reducing the impact of the tax.
Thus, the basic idea of deferred compensation is, first, to have compensa-
*General Tax Attorney, Norfolk and Western Railway Company. A.B., Duke, 1962;
LL.B., Harvard, 1965.
'Leo, Executive Lures and Incentives in the Nation's Top 100, BusiaNss MANAGE-
tENT 29 (March 1971). This article is part of an annual Executive Compensation Re-
port which shows the trends in the entire area of compensation used by large companies.
2 Pub. L. No. 91-172 (December 30, 1969). Hereafter sections of the Act will be
cited simply as sections of the Internal Revenue Code, which in turn will be cited as
1RC § -.
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tion taxed at a lower rate than it would be if received currently. This
objective can be accomplished by either deferral until retirement or, where
the compensation is uneven, because of a bonus, for example, deferral to
a later year to get an income averaging effect.'
Since it achieves its first goal by postponing the tax, deferred compensa-
tion sometimes also seeks, as a second objective, to provide a tax sheltered
growth of the funds available for eventual distribution.4 If the funds allo-
cated for compensation can be set aside for investment without being
diminished by tax payments, the greater investment leverage can signifi-
cantly increase the total dollars available for ultimate distribution. The
dual objectives of deferred compensation are, therefore, tax sheltered
investment growth and taxation of income at lower rates. Deferred com-
pensation seeks to protect against present tax at high rates in favor of
later taxation at lower rates.
The types of deferred compensation plans are extremely varied and
individualized and may or may not include both of the basic benefits.
They may take the form of individual contracts or a general plan covering
a group of executives. It is also common for companies to have different
plans for different groups of employees. The arrangement is often tied to
the employee's continued service with the company or to an agreement
not to compete if he does leave the company. Further, deferred compensa-
tion plans may have incentive elements related to company earnings, divi-
dends, stock performance or a combination of factors. Phantom stock, a
method of deferred compensation which credits an employee's deferred
account with amounts equivalent to shares of company stock which, hope-
fully, grow prior to the time of payment and sometimes accumulate divi-
dends as well, is a frequently used deferred compensation device.
Many of the basic provisions of deferred arrangements, however, are
part of the effort to assure the deferral of tax. To see the evolution of the
arrangements and the basic requirements for reaching the desired tax
planning goal requires some history.
II. The Basic Rules-Revenue Ruling 60-31 and Friends
There are two problems for the tax attorney in formulating a successful
3 IRC §§ 1301-1305, the income averaging provisions, effective for 1964 and later years
only somewhat reduced the importance of this latter deferral.
4 The third desired effect is, of course, to produce capital gain treatment on some or
all of the final payment. This is the basic idea of the stock related forms of compen-
sation (e.g., restricted stock, options, etc.). Qualified pension plans also have some of
this element.
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deferred compensation arrangement. They are constructive receipt and
economic benefit. The problems arise simply from the fact that the com-
pensation is earned now but paid later.
The general rule for inclusion in income is that
[t]he amount of any item of gross income shall be included in the
gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer....
However, the Regulations incorporate the constructive receipt doctrine:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available
so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn
upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had
been given. However, income is not constructively received if the tax-
payer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or re-
strictions....
The regulation cites examples of constructive receipt but they are not in
terms helpful in the deferred compensation area. Thus, the problem of
what are "substantial limitations or restrictions" is raised by the regulation
but not answered.
In several early cases the taxpayers achieved considerable success in
overcoming constructive receipt arguments made by the Internal Revenue
Service. The two Veit cases' illustrate this success. The first case involved
an employment contract which Veit had with his employer, pursuant to
which he received a salary plus ten per cent of the net profits of the corpo-
ration for the two years covered by the contract. The compensation was
to be paid in the year following the second year of the profit determination,
and, in order for Veit to be entitled to the additional compensation, he was
required to remain with the company for the entire two-year period of the
contract. During the second year, the taxpayer and the company entered
into a second agreement pursuant to which the compensation due under
the bonus arrangement was deferred one year more. Then, before the time
at which his rights matured under the amended contract, Veit and the
corporation entered into an agreement to defer the payments over a five-
5IRC § 451(a).
OTreas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (1970).
7 Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947); Howard Veit, 8 T.C.M. 919 (1949).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
year period. In the first case the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer
had constructively received the amounts to which the employment contract
related as of the year in which the first deferral was made. The Tax Court
refused to find constructive receipt because the taxpayer and the corpora-
tion had entered into an "arm's length business transaction" prior to the
time the taxpayer's right to receive the payments had matured.8
In the second Veit case, the court concentrated on the second deferral
agreement which called for payment of the compensation in installments
over a period of five years. Again, the court refused to find constructive
receipt. It observed that "there was never a time when the [amount] was
unqualifiedly subject to . . . demand or withdrawal." ' Thus, in the view
of the Tax Court, so long as the agreement to defer was made prior to the
time the rights to receive payment under an employment contract matured,
the doctrine of constructive receipt would not apply. The Internal Revenue
Service acquiesced in the first case.'"
These cases indicated one helpful rule-the deferral can be made after
the compensation is earned so long as it is made before the right to receive
arose and providing that it is not a subterfuge. 1
In 1960 the Service issued its first substantive statement in the area,
Revenue Ruling 60-31" which sets the basic pattern within which deferred
compensation operates. Because it is the chief pronouncement of the Service
and because subsequent development of deferred compensation followed
its outline, it deserves special attention here. The ruling described five fac-
tual situations involving deferred arrangements and, citing Section 1.451-
1(a) and Section 1.446-1(c)(1)(e) of the Regulations, determined that
"the question for resolution is whether in each of the situations described
the income in question was constructively received in a taxable year prior
to the taxable year of actual receipt." "
The ruling, in discussing constructive receipt, used the following lan-
guage to set its standards:
8 8 T.C., supra note 7, at 818.
9 8 T.C.M., supra note 7, at 919, 922.
10 1947-2 CuM. BuLL. 4.
11 Interestingly, the court was untroubled by the fact that the corporation, on the
accrual basis, could sustain a deduction in an earlier year than the cash basis recipient
reported income. Howard Veit, supra note 7, at 922. But see IRC § 404(a) (5), which
now provides to the contrary.
12 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174.
13 Id. at 177.
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(1) "A mere promise to pay, not represented by notes or secured in any
way, is not regarded as a receipt of income...."
(2) But, "a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back upon income
and thereby select the year for which he will report it."
(3) "However, the statute cannot be administered by speculating'
whether the payor would have been willing to agree to an earlier
payment."
In short, the question is factual under the substantial limitations test of the
regulation. Having outlined the law in such general terms, the ruling con-
sidered each of the five situations.
In the first illustration, the taxpayer and a corporation had executed a
five-year employment contract under which the taxpayer received a stated
salary, plus additional annual compensation in a fixed amount. The addi-
tional compensation was credited to a bookkeeping reserve to be paid in
equal annual installments over a five-year period beginning with the termi-
nation of the taxpayer's employment. The ruling specifically stated that the
corporation was under a mere contractual obligation to make the pay-
ments when due and no trust was intended. The contract also provided
that, if the taxpayer failed or refused to perform his duties, the corpora-
tion's obligation was relieved as to additional contributions to the reserve.
The contract contained no provision for forfeiture by the employee, and,
on his death, the remaining balance would be distributed to his estate. The
ruling held that under this arrangement the additional compensation would
be taxable only as actually received.
The second factual situation involved a more general plan to make
future payments of additional compensation for current services to a num-
ber of key employees designated by the company's board of directors. The
amount of additional compensation depended on a percentage of annual
net earnings in excess of a prescribed figure. The amount so allocated was
set up in a separate account for each participant and distributions from the
account were made when the employee reached sixty years of age or was
no longer employed by the company. Distributions were made over a
period of years and the employer's obligation was contingent upon the
employee's refraining from competitive activities and remaining available
for consultation. In the event of death, distribution would be made to the
employee's estate. Again, it was specifically provided that the corporation
14 Id. at 177-78.
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had a mere contractual obligation to make the payments and no trust was
intended. As with the first situation, the ruling held that the deferred com-
pensation would be includable only when actually received. The ruling took
pains to emphasize that neither arrangement constituted a trust, and both
were accordingly distinguishable from cases involving trust arrangements
and to the situation to which Section 1.402 (b) (1) (a) (1) refers.1" Aside
from this reference to trust characteristics, the ruling did not discuss the
Service's reasoning concerning the first two cases nor did it disclose what
facts the Service considered relevant in deciding that constructive receipt
did not occur in them.
The third case involved an agreement between an author and a pub-
lisher. The taxpayer granted to the publisher the rights to his book, and,
pursuant to the agreement, the publisher agreed to pay specified royalties
based on receipts from the sale of the work. At the same time, a second
agreement was entered into providing that in consideration of the first
contract the publisher would not pay the taxpayer more than a specified
sum in any one calendar year. Any amounts in excess of that sum would
be carried over into succeeding years. Again, the ruling on deferral was
favorable, noting that the supplemental agreement was made before the
royalties were earned. Thus, the royalties were held includable in income
only as actually received.
The two remaining cases involved in the ruling related to bonus arrange-
ments. In the fourth situation the taxpayer was a football player who
entered into a two-year contract for a specified salary. In addition, it was
agreed that he would be paid a bonus in a specified amount. The ruling
stated that the taxpayer could have demanded and received payment of the
bonus at the time of signing the contract. Instead, however, the taxpayer
arranged that the bonus should be paid to an escrow agent designated by
him subject to the company's approval. The escrow account was in the
taxpayer's name, payments were made subject only to the escrow agree-
ment, and, in the event of death, the amount was to be paid to the tax-
payer's estate. The ruling held that the bonus payment was taxable in the
year paid to the escrow agent. It distinguished this case from an earlier
ruling" which had held a baseball player's bonus taxable when received
on the grounds that payment to the escrow agent gave the taxpayer eco-
nomic control over the amount. The ruling cited E. T. Sproull v. Com-
15 Cf. REv. RuL. 57-37, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 18; REv. RUL. 57-28, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 263.
16 REv. RUL. 57-727, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 25.
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missionery which relied not on constructive receipt but on the economic
benefit theory to tax an amount contributed to a trust for the benefit of
a taxpayer.
The fifth case described in the ruling involved a boxer who entered into
an agreement with a boxing club under which he was to receive a per-
centage of the gross receipts from a fight. At the same time, a separate
agreement was executed providing for payment of the taxpayer's share over
a four-year period. In this case the Service found that the agreement con-
stituted a joint venture. Thus, the taxpayer was not an employee of the
club, and, consequently, the ruling held that his share of the gross receipts
belonged to him all along. Having all the benefits of his share, the boxer
was taxable immediately."
The principles of this ruling are very difficult to adapt to factual situa-
tions other than those described in it, particularly since the ruling empha-
sized that constructive receipt and the realization of economic benefit are
basically factual determinations. The ruling did, however, lay down some
guidelines. For example, it indicated that amounts credited to deferred
compensation accounts should remain assets of the employer rather than
being set aside in separate accounts or trusts. Establishing an escrow ac-
count is similarly undesirable. On the other hand, an absence of forfeiture
provisions in the deferred compensation contract is not fatal. Particularly
in the last instance the ruling eliminated the need for provisions which had
commonly been included in deferred compensation contracts prior to its
issuance.
Disappointingly, Revenue Ruling 60-31 announced a no-ruling policy
which left uncertainty in the area and was not changed until 1964." 9
Revenue Ruling 60-31 remained the basic statement of the Internal
Revenue Service position until fairly recently when a series of additional
rulings broadened the scope of the deferred compensation rules. Because
the need to assure tax deferral leads to caution in drafting plans and con-
tracts within the bounds of Service policy, the law of deferred compensation
finds its basic voice in such rulings rather than in litigation. Examination
of the rulings thus is necessary for an understanding of the permissible in
deferred compensation.
Precision in describing what characteristics of a deferred compensation
17 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
18 But see Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20 (1965); REV. RuL. 70-435, 1970-34 Irr. REv.
BuLL., at 12, which have revised this holding.
19 REv. RuL. 64-279, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 121.
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arrangement would be acceptable was not particularly advanced, however,
by Revenue Ruling 67-449.2" There the deferred compensation plan in-
volved supplemental compensation awards payable over a four-year period.
The rights of the employee to each installment would accrue only if "during
the entire period from the making of the award until December 31 of the
year preceding that in which such installment is payable, he has earned out
such installment." To earn the installment the employee must continue
in the employ of the company, or, if his employment is terminated, he must
refrain from engaging in competition or entering the service of a competing
company and must make himself available to consult with the company.
The employee had a further election to defer the payment of each install-
ment until after termination of employment, providing that he met the
same conditions until the time at which payment was to be made. This
latter election had to be made not later than December 15 of the year pre-
ceding the year in which each installment would otherwise be payable.
With regard to this arrangement, the ruling held:
... in view of the substantial forfeiture provisions set out in this non-
qualified deferred compensation plan, compensation deferred thereunder
will be taxable only in the taxable year in which it is actually received
unless otherwise made available to the employee at an earlier date."'
The deferral in this ruling is not surprising in view of the standards of
Revenue Ruling 60-31. What is surprising, in view of the statement in the
former ruling that such provisions would not be required, is the apparent
reliance on the forfeiture provisions in the plan as a requirement for deferral.
It has been suggested that the Service did not intend to change the stan-
dards promulgated in Revenue Ruling 60-31 It is, however, very difficult
to reconcile this view with the ruling's statements of reliance on forfeiture
provisions." What was becoming clear is the extent to which an employee
may be allowed to go in making a series of elections as to his time of receipt
of deferred compensation awards provided such elections are made prior
to the year in which his rights mature.
The Service has also indicated that some types of funding to protect
deferred compensation awards of an employee will be permitted, notwith-
20 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 173.
21 Id. at 174.
2 2 See McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Conceptual Astigmatism, 24 TAx L. REv.
201, 234-35 (1969).
23 But cf. REv. RuL. 69-649; 1969-2 GuM. BuLL. 106.
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standing the language of Revenue Ruling 60-31 in connection with the
absence of trusts for the benefit of the employee and the unfavorable result
in the escrow situation. In Revenue Ruling 68-99,24 the taxpayer and the
employer executed an employment contract under which the taxpayer
at retirement would receive a specified monthly payment for life. The
employer, after the employment contract had been entered into, made a
contract with an insurance company for life insurance on the employee
in order to insure that funds would be available to pay the pension. All
rights under the insurance policy were retained by the employer and the
proceeds were payable only to the employer. The ruling held that the
contract did not result in the recognition of income by the employee since
the insurance contract did not produce a present economic benefit and that
income would be incurred only as payments under it were actually made
to the taxpayer. Unlike the football player's escrow account in Revenue
Ruling 60-31, the control over the policy was retained by the employer.
As a result, the economic benefit doctrine did not produce taxable income.
This ruling accordingly opened the use of insurance as a protective funding
medium for deferred compensation so long as the employee did not obtain
control of the policy.
Two rulings in 1969 were concerned with more typical deferred com-
pensation arrangements. Revenue Ruling 69-6492" discussed a situation
where the employer awarded an annual incentive bonus to certain key
employees and normally paid such awards in cash. During 1967, however,
the employer approved a supplementary retirement plan under which part
or all of an incentive award could be paid in the future, the deferral being
made at the sole discretion of the committee determining the amount of the
award. The employee was not given an election as to whether the award
would 'be deferred or not, that determination residing entirely in the com-
mittee. The facts further stated that the corporation's obligation was merely
contractual without any funding, although no further services were required
to receive the award. The ruling held that any deferred bonus award would
not be includable in income in the year earned, but would be included
only in the taxable year actually received. This ruling indicates that the
Service will not require any additional services between the time the award
is earned and the time it is paid in order for deferral to take place. This
would seem to indicate that the forfeiture provisions and the additional
24 1968-1 Cum. BuL. 193.
25 1969-2 CuM. Bu.LL. 106.
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employment requirements referred to in Revenue Ruling 67-449 would not
be required for favorable ruling.
Revenue Ruling 69-6502" similarly involved a general employment con-
tract made available to a group of employees earning a specified amount
of compensation. Pursuant to the contract, each executive could elect to
defer receipt of a portion of his scheduled salary. Election was made before
the beginning of the year to which the salary related and, pursuant to it,
the employee could elect to defer either five or ten per cent of his salary.
Where an election was made, the corporation established a deferred com-
pensation account for each employee, but the ruling specifically stated that
the amounts deferred were to be satisfied from general corporate funds
subject to the claims of the creditors. Again, the facts of the ruling did not
state any continuing obligation on the part of the employee to be available
for consultation or similar services. Distribution was to be made in install-
ments following termination of regular employment. In this case, the ruling
held that the deferred portion of the employee's salary was not includable
in income in the year earned, but its inclusion was deferred until the year
in which it was actually received or made available to him. Thus, the
deferred portion need not be a special amount but may constitute a portion
of an employee's regular salary, provided the election is made before the
year in which the salary is earned. Again, the Service will probably not
require the performance of any continuing services, provided that the
arrangement is not funded.
The pattern of rulings following Revenue Ruling 60-31 establishes a very
broad scope for deferred compensation arrangements. The rulings give
substantial latitude to corporations and employees in making the elections,
and they do not, at least in the case of nonfunded plans, require continuing
services or forfeiture provisions.
Restricted stock, while not strictly deferred compensation within the
limited scope of this analysis, applies comparable rules, and the develop-
ment of restricted stock as a compensation device was significant in terms
of motivating Congress to make changes in the Tax Reform Act. The basic
restricted stock rules are set out in Revenue Ruling 68-86.27 The ruling
poses the case of an agreement between a corporation and its employee
under which the employee received a base salary plus an annual bonus. The
employee could elect prior to the beginning of each year to have all or part
of the bonus awarded to him in restricted stock. The shares of such stock
261d. at 107.
27 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 184.
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were stamped with a legend stating that they could not be sold, assigned,
transferred, discounted or pledged as collateral without the prior written
consent of the salary committee of the employer's board of directors. These
restrictions continued during the term of employment and lapsed a specific
number of years after the termination of employment. The corporation's
salary committee could, in its judgment, approve a release from the restric-
tions in the case of hardship. The ruling determined that these restrictions
had a significant effect on the value of the stock. Thus, pursuant to the rules
of Section 1.421-6(d) (2) of the Regulations, compensation would be
realized by the employee when the restrictions lapse or when the stock is
sold, whichever happens first.
Accordingly, the election by the employee . . . to have all or part of
any bonus awarded him for that year paid to him in stock of his em-
ployer corporation that is subject to restrictions which have a significant
effect on its value, will result in the realization of compensation by the
employee at the time the restrictions on the stock lapse, or the stock is
sold in an arm's length transaction, whichever event occurs earlier.2 8
The restricted stock ruling opened an active new area in the deferred
compensation field. 29 As will be noted, however, this area of deferred
compensation was quickly foreclosed, or at least limited, by the Tax Reform
Act. " It would also appear from the ruling, however, that a provision per-
mitting an employee to receive compensation otherwise deferred pursuant
to a hardship provision in the plan will not prevent the plan from resulting
in deferral of income. The Service may be reluctant to rule in this area
in the absence of specific statements of the conditions in which hardship will
be found.
III. The Tax Reform Act
One of the most significant things about the Tax Reform Act in the
deferred compensation area is what it did not do. The proposed provision
on deferred compensation contained in the House version of the Act3
28 Id. at 185. The ruling also determined that the amount of the compensation would
be the lesser of fair market value determined without regard to the restrictions at the
time of acquisition of the stock or the fair market value of the stock at the time the
restrictions lapsed or the consideration was received on its sale.
29 See generally Childs, Restricted Stock, 46 TAxts 753 (Dec. 1968).
30 ndeed, the Treasury by proposing amendments to the Regulations sought to close
it even before the Act was passed.
31 H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 331 (1969).
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was omitted by the Senate. The proposed section would have continued
the deferral of tax on deferred compensation arrangements but when the
deferred compensation was received a minimum tax would have applied to
deferred compensation in excess of $10,000 received in any taxable year.
The minimum tax would have been computed by attributing the deferred
income to the years in which it was considered earned and calculating tax
at the rates attributable to that year. Deferred compensation would have
been considered earned ratably over the employee's entire period of service
unless, under regulations to be promulgated, the payment was found prop-
erly attributable to only a portion of the period. In the alternative, the
deferred compensation would have been taxed by calculating an average
increase in tax for the recipient's highest three taxable years during the
last ten years of his earning period. Transitional rules made the proposed
section inapplicable to deferred compensation attributable to a taxable year
beginning before January 1, 1970, and also to any deferred compensation
attributable to a taxable year beginning before January 1, 1974, if paid
or made available pursuant to a binding contract existing on July 11,
1969.32
In discussing the reasons for the proposed change, the committee report
noted that, pursuant to Revenue Ruling 60-31 and its fellows, tax deferral
was easily available in the case of unfunded arrangements. In the case of
funded arrangements the report observed that an employee would be taxed
currently on the contribution to the fund if his rights were nonforfeitable
even though receipt was postponed. Looking at these two rules, the report
stated that
[i]t is anomalous that the tax treatment of deferred compensation should
depend on whether the amount to be deferred is placed in a trust or
whether it is merely accumulated as a reserve on the books of the em-
ployer corporation. An employee who receives additional compensation in
the form of a promise to pay him that compensation in the future made
by a large, financially sound, corporation, is probably as likely to receive
the compensation as an employee whose deferred compensation is placed
in trust.33
The arguments for and against this proposal were summarized by the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation and the Senate Finance
32 See generally Report of the Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
13270, H.R. Rep. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 89-91 (1969).
33 1d. at 90.
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Committee in a document explaining the House proposals for the Senate
Finance Committee. 4 In favor of the minimum tax, it noted the argument
that an employee receiving deferred compensation has really received a
valuable contractual right and the proposal represented a reasonable com-
promise between immediate taxation and complete deferral of tax on this
right. It was also argued that the distinction in the treatment of funded
and unfunded compensation was not sound. Further, the income shifting
possibilities were regarded as undesirable. Finally, the fifty per cent maxi-
mum tax on earned income proposed elsewhere in the bill was suggested
as a factor reducing the impact of restricting deferral.
In favor of preserving the existing treatment, it was argued that deferred
compensation arrangements provide a useful compensation tool for smaller
and medium-sized companies and that deferred compensation benefits were
valuable tax incentives. In addition, the taxation of income at tax rates
applicable to years other than the year in which the income was received
was regarded as undesirable. Finally, the difficulty of administering the
proposal was cited.
The Senate omitted the House's proposed section on deferred compensa-
tion. 5 The omission of this section from the Tax Reform Act was sustained
in conference."0
In short, the House enacted a middle-ground proposal for taxing deferred
compensation plans. Tax would have been deferred but would have been
imposed when the compensation was received at the rates which would
have applied if it had been taxed when earned. In supporting the omission
of the proposed section before the Senate Finance Committee, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Cohen indicated that the Treasury
believed that the deferred compensation area required additional study with
a view towards determining a better solution to the problems in the area
than the proposed provision.37
The most important thing that the Tax Reform Act did do to deferred
compensation was to enact Section 1348 of the Code establishing a fifty
3 4 Summary of H.R. 13270, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 (as passed by the House of
Representatives), 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 52-54 (Comm. Print 1969).
35 Summary of Senate Amendments to H.R. 13270, Tax Reform Act of 1969 (Part 1)
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (Comm. Print 1969).
a3 Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 13270, Rep. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 305 (1969).
37 Statement of The Honorable David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury, Com-
mittee on Finance, U. S. Senate, Tax Reform Act of 1969, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 51
(Comm. Print 1969).
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per cent maximum rate on earned income. For the highest-paid executives,
the advantages of deferred compensation may be substantially limited by the
availability of the new fifty per cent tax. The new fifty per cent tax rate
ceiling, compared to the prior top rate of seventy per cent, is of fairly limited
application, however, because on a joint return the fifty per cent rate is
reached only for taxable income in excess of $52,000. Considering deduc-
tions and personal exemptions, substantial savings on current income pro-
duced by the reduction of the maximum rate on earned income will not be
significant for very many individuals. For the more modestly paid, the
advantage of deferring compensation into years after retirement will con-
tinue to be significant."8
The maximum tax section has another effect on deferred compensation
resulting from the fact that the maximum rate applies only to earned in-
come as it is defined in the section."9 Earned income expressly does not
include "any deferred compensation within the meaning of Section 404."
Since the latter section includes any compensation paid or accrued on
account of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such com-
pensation,4" most types of deferred compensation will be excluded from the
earned income provisions when received. On the face of the provision, there-
fore, an executive whose income is high enough at the time deferred com-
pensation is received would have a detriment from deferring compensation
into a later year since the deferred compensation could be taxed at rates
higher than fifty per cent, compared to taxation at a maximum of fifty per
cent if received in the year earned.
There is an important exception to this, however, since "deferred com-
pensation does not include any amount received before the end of the tax-
able year following the first taxable year of the recipient in which his
right to receive such amount is not subject to a substantial risk of for-
feiture . ,, 41 Thus, deferred compensation received by the end of the
year after the year in which there is no longer a risk of forfeiture is still
subject to the fifty per cent maximum tax.
Substantial risk of forfeiture is a term added to the tax law by the new
provisions cn restricted stock.2" A substantial risk of forfeiture exists under
38 See, e.g., Bachelder, Executive Compensation After the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
48 TAxES 652, 656 (Nov. 1970).
39 IRC § 1348(b) (1).
4o IRC § 404(a).
41 IRC § 1348(b) (1).
42 IRC § 83(c) (1).
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that section if a person's rights to property are conditioned upon future
performance of substantial services. Until regulations are issued, it will not
be clear what the parameters of this provision are but, as has previously
been noted, deferred compensation frequently does not involve any require-
ment for additional services in years after that in which the deferred com-
pensation is earned. 3 In order, therefore, to make available a distribution
of deferred compensation qualified for the fifty per cent maximum tax, the
deferred compensation arrangement would have to be tailored to require
performances up to the year or years in which payment is available. On the
other hand, by definition, a deferral for not more than one year past the
year in which earned would not be excluded from the fifty per cent maxi-
mum tax rules.
Another change made by the Tax Reform Act which affects the deferred
compensation area is the new limitation on the use of restricted stock.
Under newly enacted Section 83, the excess of the fair market value of
restricted property (determined without regard to the restrictions) in excess
of the amount paid for the property is included in income in the first taxable
year in which the rights of the taxpayer are transferable or are not subject
to substantial risk of forfeiture. The recipient may, however, elect to include
the taxable amount in income in the year received." This provision sub-
stantially limits the application of Revenue Ruling 68-86" and the provi-
sions of Section 1.421-6 of the Regulations, by requiring that restricted
stock be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture in order for the deferral
to occur." The problems as to what constitutes a substantial risk of for-
feiture have been noted above. Under Section 83, however, restricted stock
is significantly limited, making other forms of deferred compensation more
interesting.
In addition to these basic changes in the deferred compensation area,
several other provisions of the Tax Reform Act must now be considered
in making basic decisions as to the use of deferred compensation plans. For
example, the increase in capital gains rates,47 the inclusion of capital gains
items as preference items subject to the minimum tax on preferences," and
43 See, e.g., REv. RuiL. 69-649, supra note 25.
44 IRC § 83 (b).
45 See note 28 supra.
4 6 For general discussion of this provision, see Bachelder, supra note 40, at 669 et seq.
See also Summary of H.R. 13270, Tax Reform Act of 1969, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44
et ,eq. (Comm. Print 1969).
47 IRC § 1201.
48IRC §§ 56-58.
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the liberalized income averaging provisions,49 all need to be considered in
determining the desirability of a deferred compensation arrangement for
each individual.
IV. The Current Status of Deferred Compensation
Generally, while the Tax Reform Act has made a number of changes
in the general area of deferred compensation which must be reckoned with
in formulating new deferred compensation plans and in living with existing
plans, it has not destroyed the utility of deferred compensation for most
executives. The highest paid executives will want to reconsider the value of
a deferral which, when received, will not qualify for the fifty per cent
maximum tax on earned income unless subjected to a substantial risk of
forfeiture during the interim and taken within two years after the time that
restriction lapses. Where, however, earnings after retirement for an execu-
tive are not expected to approach the level at which the marginal tax rate
is fifty per cent or more, deferral of compensation to that period can still
be very valuable. In both cases the opportunities for delaying the imposition
of the tax are still favorable in terms of increased investment leverage during
the interim period.
The efforts of the House Ways and Means Committee to restrict the
availability of deferred compensation at the time of the Tax Reform Act
are disturbing, particularly when they are considered with the Treasury
Department's promise to review the area of deferred compensation and
develop specific proposals. Deferred compensation today must thus be con-
sidered in terms of possible changes in its status. One likely avenue of
change would be a rule comparable to the new Section 83 which would
apply to deferred compensation arrangements. Deferred compensation plans
would be required to include a substantial risk of forfeiture, however that
term is ultimately defined in the Regulations or by the courts. This could
restrict one of the most attractive features of deferred compensation plans
but would by no means end its attractiveness as an executive compensation
device. Treasury or Congress may well have other ideas for limiting deferred
compensation. Adoption of new deferred compensation plans and continu-
ance of old plans must, therefore, be made with the expectation of watching
changes in the legislative area very closely. Until such changes are made,
however, deferred compensation remains a very useful device for executive
pay.
49 IRC § 1302.
